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Abstract: 10 
In 2008 a runaway chemical reaction caused an explosion at a methomyl unit in West Virginia, USA, 11 
killing two employees, injuring eight people, evacuating more than 40,000 residents adjacent to the 12 
facility, disrupting traffic on a nearby highway and causing significant business loss and interruption. 13 
Although the accident was formally investigated, the role of the situation awareness (SA) factor, i.e. a 14 
correct understanding of the situation, and appropriate models to maintain SA, remain unexplained. 15 
This paper extracts details of abnormal situations within the methomyl unit and models them into a 16 
situational network using dynamic Bayesian networks. A fuzzy logic system is used to resemble the 17 
operator‟s thinking when confronted with these abnormal situations. The combined situational 18 
network and fuzzy logic system make it possible for the operator to assess such situations 19 
dynamically to achieve accurate SA. The findings show that the proposed structure provides a useful 20 
graphical model that facilitates the inclusion of prior background knowledge and the updating of this 21 
knowledge when new information is available from monitoring systems. 22 
Keywords: Situation awareness, Situation assessment, Abnormal situations, Methomyl unit, Accident 23 
analysis. 24 
1. Introduction 25 
On Thursday 28 August 2008 a runaway chemical reaction occurred at a methomyl production facility 26 
in Institute, West Virginia, USA. Highly flammable solvent sprayed from a 4,500 gallon pressure vessel 27 
known as a residue treater and immediately ignited, killing two employees and injuring eight firefighters 28 
and contractors. The intense fire burned for more than four hours, more than 40,000 residents were 29 
evacuated to shelter-in-place for over three hours, and the highway was closed for hours because of 30 
smoke disruption to traffic. The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation team determined that the 31 
runaway chemical reaction and loss of containment of the flammable and toxic chemicals was the result 32 
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of deviation from the written start-up procedures and included the bypassing of critical safety devices 33 
intended to prevent such a condition occurring. A poor process mimic screen, which could not provide 34 
adequate situation awareness (SA) for the board operator, was another important contributing factor (CSB 35 
2011). The tragic event at Institute is an example of the difficulties experienced with regard to loss of SA, 36 
poor SA or lack of SA, all of which are now popular terms in accident investigation reports. However, SA 37 
itself is not the only cause of accidents (Dekker 2013). In the case of the Texas City, TX BP Amoco 38 
Refinery explosion on 23 March 2005, in which 15 workers were killed and 170 injured, several failed 39 
control instrumentation and alarms caused an overfilled and over-pressurized tower to discharge a large 40 
quantity of flammable liquid into the atmosphere, while the control room operator could not maintain 41 
accurate SA when monitoring this complex, fast moving environment, and an ignition created one of the 42 
worst industrial disasters in recent US history (Pridmore 2007).  43 
A situation is a set of circumstances in which a number of objects may have relationships with one 44 
another and the environment, and situation awareness (SA) is knowing and understanding what is going 45 
on around you and predicting how things will change (Vincenzi et al. 2004). To date, several SA models, 46 
such as Endsley (1995), Bendy and Meister (1999), and Adams et al. (1995) have been developed; 47 
however, Endsley‟s model has undoubtedly received the most attention. This three-level model describes 48 
SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 49 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley 1995). The 50 
three-level model describes SA as an internally held product, comprising three hierarchical levels (i.e. 51 
perception, comprehension, and projection), that is separate from the processes called situation 52 
assessment used to achieve it (Endsley 1995). In fact, situation assessment models explain the main 53 
features and general principles about how people process information and interact with the environment 54 
to maintain their SA. The primary research into SA came from the aviation industry, when a review of 55 
aircraft accidents showed that poor SA was the main causal factor. It was also found that most of the 56 
errors occurred when data were unavailable or difficult to discriminate or detect (level 1). About 20% of 57 
errors involved lack of, or an incomplete mental model, use of an incorrect mental model, over-reliance 58 
on default values, and miscellaneous other factors (level 2). In addition, around 3.5% of errors involved 59 
over-projection of current trends or miscellaneous other factors (level3). Another review in offshore 60 
drilling accidents by Sneddon et al. (2013) showed that 40% of such accidents are related to SA, and the 61 
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majority of those SA errors (67%) occurred at the perceptual level, 20% concerned comprehension, and 62 
13% arose during projection. Therefore, this is not a problem limited to aviation, but one faced by many 63 
complex systems when combining and presenting the vast amounts of data available from many 64 
technological systems in order to provide true SA is a challenge. 65 
In complex systems, SA level 1 is highly supported through the various heterogeneous sensors and 66 
appropriate signal-processing methods to extract as much information as possible about the dynamic 67 
environment and its elements, but regarding SA levels 2 and 3, there is still a need for appropriate and 68 
effective methods to support operators to infer real situations and to project their status in the near future 69 
(Fischer et al. 2011, Jones et al. 2011). In maritime security, an automated system has been developed 70 
that has the ability to recognize any deviance from normal behavior (Van den Broek et al. 2011). In 71 
military services, there are several SA systems, such as (Ghanea-Hercock et al. 2007) and (Smart et al. 72 
2007), that are able to collect, filter and present different sources of data, and also support some form of 73 
low-level data fusion and analysis. However, these systems are not able to provide a deep, semantic 74 
modeling of the domain and are consequently unable to generate conclusions. Their users have to 75 
integrate information by themselves to assess and project a future situation, so a system architecture has 76 
been developed by Baader et al. (2009) that focuses on using formal logic and an automated theorem to 77 
build an SA system in a more useful way. In the force protection domain, Brannon et al. (2009) used 78 
machine learning techniques to project a threat index. They took into account various inputs such as 79 
binary, categorical, and real-valued data to generate attributes including confidence levels, as well as 80 
evidence in support of, or against the assessment. In the aviation domain, an SA system called the tactile 81 
situation awareness system (TSAS) has been developed by Kim and Hoffmann (2003) to improve the SA 82 
of pilots in simulated rotorcraft under high-load working conditions. Rather than presenting visual or 83 
aural information for the efficient delivery of SA, this system relies on a wearable suit equipped with a 84 
tactile device that provides an intuitive human computer interface with three-dimensional space. In the 85 
domain of nuclear power plants, Kim and Seong (2006) proposed a computational model of situation 86 
assessment that projects the states of the environment probabilistically when receiving information from 87 
indicators. Fischer and Beyerer (2012) also applied automated projection in surveillance systems where 88 
situations of interest in the maritime domain are recognized by calculating probabilities for the situations, 89 
given evidence obtained from observable characteristics. Although the application of SA systems is not 90 
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limited to the above domains, its application in safety-critical environments such as process control is 91 
very rare. Most prior system safety studies in these environments focus on the deviation of the process 92 
from an acceptable range of operation. Therefore, in the development of operator support systems, the use 93 
of quantitative knowledge and hardware failures has been relied on significantly. Most of these research 94 
studies focus on the identification of operation faults (Qian et al. 2008) or the prediction of process 95 
variables (Juricek et al. 2001) that will violate an emergency limit in the future; however, further research 96 
showed that when faults occur, human operators have to rely on their experience under working pressure 97 
to understand what is going on and to contribute a solution (Klashner and Sabet 2007). When an 98 
abnormal situation occurs in a safety-critical system, operators firstly recognize it by receiving an alarm, 99 
and secondly need to understand what is happening in the plant by situation assessment. During the 100 
situation assessment process, operators receive information from observable variables or other operators 101 
and process the information to establish situation models based on their mental models (Kim and Seong 102 
2006).  103 
This study aims to introduce a methodology to model and analyze the SA factor in abnormal situations 104 
that can be utilized in the development of operator support systems. To identify abnormal situations, this 105 
paper uses risk indicators. Therefore, when a hazardous situation is defined as a possible circumstance 106 
immediately before harm is produced by the hazard, an abnormal situation is defined as a hazardous 107 
situation if its risk is not acceptable. This definition can also help operators to understand the hierarchy of 108 
investigations (i.e. a situation with a higher risk has priority over other situations to be investigated). The 109 
paper uses Bayesian networks to model situation models based on a control room operator‟s mental 110 
models, and it also relies on risk level projections to show whether the situation is abnormal or not, and 111 
provides the priorities. A human-system interface based on the proposed approach is designed for the 112 
methomyl unit environment and the performance of the system is investigated through real data collected 113 
from the unit.  114 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our methodology for modeling and analyzing the 115 
SA factor. The process of the residue treater and timeline of events are explained in Section 3. The 116 
performance and results of the proposed methodology in the residue treater environment are presented in 117 
Section 4. The conclusion and future work are summarized in Section 5. 118 
 119 
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2. Modeling and analyzing situation awareness 120 
The use of Bayesian networks (BNs) in situation assessment configuration of dynamic and complex 121 
domains has several advantages in comparison with other situation assessment methods that use other 122 
artificial intelligence tools such as expert systems (Naderpour and Lu 2012a) and neural networks 123 
(Naderpour and Lu 2012b). First, it includes nodes and directed arcs to express the knowledge, and new 124 
information can be transmitted by directed arcs between nodes. Second, knowledge in the component can 125 
be updated, whereas updating knowledge in expert systems is difficult. Third, it already has expert 126 
knowledge encoded in its construction, while neural networks must learn knowledge via datasets, 127 
assuming training data are available. Lastly, the cumulative effect of situations based on new evidence is 128 
very suitable for SA continuity, whereas this feature does not exist in other artificial intelligence tools 129 
(Naderpour et al. 2014a).  130 
In the following sections, general information about BNs, and how a situational network can be 131 
developed and analyzed, are explained.  132 
2.1. Bayesian networks 133 
A situation is a set of circumstances in which a number of objects may have relationships with one 134 
another and the environment. Therefore, conventional BNs can be considered as a representation of static 135 
cause–effect relations between objects in a situation. From this point of view, a BN is a directed acyclic 136 
graph whose nodes correspond to objects and the arcs between nodes represent dependencies or direct 137 
causal influences between objects. The parameters of a BN determine the strength of the probabilistic 138 
relations between its nodes. Each node in the BN has a set of mutually exclusive and collectively 139 
exhaustive states with a probability distribution conditional on the states of its parent nodes, or an 140 
unconditional distribution if the node does not have any parents. The conditional and unconditional 141 
probabilities can be learned from available data or elicited from domain experts (Yet et al. 2013). Based 142 
on the conditional independence resulting from the d-separation concept, and the chain rule, BN 143 
represents the joint probability distribution  ( ) of variables   *          +, included in the 144 
network as: 145 
 ( )  ∏ (     (  ))
 
   
                                                                      ( ) 
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where   (  ) is the parent set of Xi  for any i=1,…,n. If   (  ) is an empty set, then Xi is a root node and 146 
 (  |  (  ))   (  )  denotes its prior probability. BN takes advantage of Bayes theorem to update the 147 
prior occurrence probability of objects given new information, called evidence E, thus yielding the 148 
posteriors. This new information usually becomes available during the operational life of a system, 149 
including the occurrence or non-occurrence of objects (Khakzad et al. 2012): 150 
 (   )  
 (   )
 ( )
 
 (   )
∑  (   ) 
                                                                ( ) 
This equation can be used for either prediction or diagnostic analysis. In predictive analysis, 151 
conditional probabilities of the form P(situation|object) are calculated, indicating the occurrence 152 
probability of a particular situation given the occurrence or non-occurrence of a certain primary object. 153 
On the other hand, in diagnostic analysis, those of the form P(object|situation) are evaluated, showing the 154 
occurrence probability of a particular object given the occurrence of a certain situation (Naderpour et al. 155 
2013). 156 
The static BN can be extended to a dynamic BN (DBN) model by introducing relevant temporal 157 
dependencies that capture the dynamic behaviors of the domain variables between representations of the 158 
static network at different times. Two types of dependencies can be distinguished in a DBN: 159 
contemporaneous and non-contemporaneous. Contemporaneous dependencies refer to arcs among nodes 160 
that represent variables within the same time period. Non-contemporaneous dependencies refer to arcs 161 
between nodes which represent variables at different times. A DBN is defined as a pair (       ) 162 
where B1 is a BN which defines the prior distribution  (  ) and 2TBN is a two-slice temporal BN with 163 
 (       )  ∏ (  
    (  
 ))
 
   
                                                           ( ) 
where   
  is a node at time slice t and   (  
 ) is the set of parent nodes which can be in time slice t or in 164 
time slice t-1. The nodes in the first slice of a 2TBN do not have any parameters associated with them, but 165 
each node in the second slice has an associated conditional probability distribution (CPD) for continuous 166 
variables or conditional probability table (CPT) for discrete variables, which defines  (  
    (  
 )) for 167 
all    . The arcs between slices are from left to right, reflecting the causal flow of time. If there is an 168 
arc from     
  to   
 , this node is called persistent. The arcs within a slice are arbitrary. Directed arcs 169 
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within a slice represent “instantaneous” causation. The semantics of a DBN can be defined by “unrolling” 170 
the 2TBN until there are T time-slices. The resulting joint distribution is then given by (Murphy 2002): 171 
 (    )  ∏∏ (  
    (  
 ))
 
   
 
   
                                                           ( ) 
2.2. Situational network development 172 
Figure 1 shows our proposed method to develop a network of abnormal situations using BNs. To 173 
identify hazardous situations, an analysis is carried out using a combination of cognitive engineering 174 
procedures and hazard identification methods. Observation of operator performance, analysis of written 175 
materials and documentation, expert elicitation and formal questionnaires may be used to conduct the 176 
analysis (Endsley 2006). Previous hazard identification documents may help with this analysis. For 177 
example, HAZOP, one of the most powerful methods available, has been well-described in the literature 178 
and can help to determine the basic objects that contribute to the occurrence of situations. The situation 179 
model usually begins with root nodes, which are the basic objects, followed by intermediate nodes, a 180 
pivot node and leaf nodes. The pivot node is the focal object that delegates the situation, and relations 181 
among the root nodes and the pivot node define the relationships among the objects. The leaf nodes may 182 
be safety barriers which are physical objects of the environment and will connect to one another if there is 183 
relation between their performances. Also, one of the leaf nodes may be a consequence node that shows 184 
the possible accidents in the situation. If the situation is inferred by one or more observable variables, the 185 
focal object is connected to the observable variables. 186 
The states of basic and intermediate objects and safety barriers are defined as Boolean (i.e. success 187 
and failure), which refers to the objects working well (success) or not working (failure). The focal object 188 
Identify the 
situations of interest 
Identify the 
contributing objects 
Develop BN models 
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has two states, i.e. safe and hazardous. The states of consequence nodes are usually determined by 189 
consequence analysis, which concerns what may follow the occurrence of an abnormal situation. The 190 
states of observables are determined in terms of operation, six sigma quality and safety set-points. As the 191 
observable variables extracted from sensors are continuous, a discretization process is required to use 192 
them in BNs. In general, mapping a continuous variable to a discrete variable can be achieved with a crisp 193 
set or a fuzzy set. Because the concept of fuzzy set theory can provide a method that is more smoothly 194 
structured, the states of observable variables are determined using a fuzzy partitioning method and fuzzy 195 
states definition (Naderpour et al. 2014b). 196 
The prior probability of basic objects (nodes without parents) can be obtained through failure 197 
probability datasets such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS 1989), and the Offshore 198 
Reliability Data Handbook (OREDA 2002), and if the failure probability is not available, expert judgment 199 
can be used. The CPTs of intermediate and pivot nodes are set based on “OR gate” or “AND gate” 200 
definitions. The CPTs of observable variables are determined by domain experts with recursive 201 
techniques (e.g. Delphi method) to guarantee the convergence of the results. The CPTs of consequence 202 
nodes are determined by 0 and 1 value corresponding to appropriate states. 203 
Based on the above description, a situation may depend on the existence of other situations, or the 204 
existence of one situation can exclude the existence of another situation. The complete modeling of the 205 
dependencies results in a network of situations. As a result of this modeling, the existence of a situation is 206 
inferred based on information in the World, i.e. the observable variables and objects of configuration 207 
space. This also includes temporal dependencies, i.e. that the existence probability of an inferred situation 208 
in future can be supported by the earlier existence of the situation itself (Naderpour et al. 2014a). 209 
Evaluation of the situational network requires the assessment of model behavior to ensure that the 210 
model demonstrates acceptable behavior. Sensitivity analysis is a technique for the systematic 211 
investigation of the influence of variation in the model inputs on this model‟s outcome, where inputs can 212 
be the parameters (i.e. values of conditional probabilities) or real inputs (i.e. values of observable nodes) 213 
(Bednarski et al. 2004). Sensitivity to findings based on a d-separation concept determines whether 214 
evidence about one variable may influence belief in a query variable. Using sensitivity to findings, it is 215 
possible to rank evidence nodes that allow the expert to identify whether a variable is sensitive or 216 
insensitive to other variables in particular contexts. This helps to identify errors in either the network 217 
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structure or the CPTs. In this regard, entropy is a common measure that assesses the average information 218 
required, in addition to the current knowledge, to specify a particular alternative. The entropy of a 219 
distribution over variable X is defined as follows: 220 
 ( )   ∑  ( )      ( )                                                        (5) 221 
and mutual information is used to measure the effect of one variable (X) on another (Y): 222 
 (   )   ( )   (   )                                                         (6) 223 
where  (   ) is the mutual information between variables. This measure reports the expected degree to 224 
which the joint probability of X and Y diverges from what it would be if X were independent of Y (Pollino 225 
et al. 2007). Sensitivity to parameters considers altering each of the parameters of query nodes and 226 
observing the related changes in the posterior probabilities of the query node. Most such sensitivity 227 
analyses are one-dimensional and, therefore, they only vary one parameter at a time. If models are 228 
unaffected by the precision of either the model or the input numbers, they may still be sensitive to 229 
changes in combinations of parameters. However, testing all possible combinations of parameters is 230 
exponentially complex (Korb and Nicholson 2003). The one-dimensional sensitivity analysis can be 231 
conducted by a sensitivity function for the output probability  ( ) when x is being varied. This sensitivity 232 
function is defined as follows (Laskey 1995): 233 
 ( )  
    
    
                                                                       (7) 234 
where  ,  ,  ,     and they are constants built from parameters that are fixed. The sensitivity value of 235 
the parameter x and the target probability can be obtained by taking the first derivative from the 236 
sensitivity as follows (Laskey 1995):  237 
  ( )  
     
(    ) 
                                                                      (8) 238 
2.3. Situational network analysis 239 
Usually, well-trained operators are able to form rules for every situation to assess their risks 240 
dynamically, and those rules are an important part of their mental models. For instance, if an operator has 241 
this rule: „when the probability of the situation of accumulated vapor in the production unit is likely and 242 
this situation has catastrophic severity, the risk level of this situation is not acceptable‟. The rule helps the 243 
operator to understand that „when the risk level of the situation of accumulated vapor is increasing, the 244 
occurrence of an explosion is possible‟. In this sense, it is assumed that the operator‟s mental model can 245 
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be modeled using the rules for hazardous situations in that environment. Based on these rules, an operator 246 
tries to keep the situational risk to as low a level as reasonably practicable. Therefore, to resemble and 247 
analyze situational behavior based on the thought processes of operators, the methodology needs to 248 
generate an assessment level of risk for every situation over time. Figure 2 shows our proposed cycle for 249 
analyzing the situational network. 250 
Suppose the configuration space   is defined by all possible physical and conceptual objects. The 251 
current risk level of a situation at time t is defined as  (  )   (  )   (  ) where  (  ) is the 252 
probability and  (  ) is the severity of the situation.  (  ) depends on the objects of the subset space  ̃: 253 
 (  )   (             ) with             ̃ and  (  ) is estimated through a loss analysis in 254 
which the adverse outcomes (human loss, asset loss, and environmental loss) associated with accidents, 255 
i.e. the states of consequence node, are converted and expressed in a common currency, such as monetary 256 
value, to provide a coherent view of the totality of loss associated with the situation (Naderpour and Lu 257 
2012a). It is also assumed that the severity of situations remains constant during the study. Twenty five 258 
rules in terms of linguistic variables elicited form operators are showed in Table 1. Fuzzy logic is used to 259 
mathematically emulate human reasoning and allow an operator to express his/her knowledge in the form 260 
of related imprecise inputs and outputs in terms of linguistic variables. The results are obtained by using a 261 
fuzzy logic system where the membership functions illustrated in Figure 3 and Mamdani‟s fuzzy logic 262 







Assign the values of observable variables 
into situational network over time 
Calculate the posterior 
probabilities 
Generate a level of risk 
for every situation 
Recover abnormal 
situations  
Figure 2: A cycle to analyze the situational network over time. 
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Table 1: Operators‟ rules for assessing the risk of situations. 270 
 Severity     




















Not acceptable Not acceptable 











By assigning the values of observable variables to the situational network, the posterior probabilities 272 
of objects and situations given this evidence, can be calculated. Consequently, the risk level of a situation 273 
will be updated. If the estimated risk of a situation is unacceptable, it is necessary to recover the situation. 274 
The situational network makes it possible to simulate the impact of recovery decisions on a situation.  275 
3. Residue treater and timeline of events 276 
A description of the residue treater process and the timeline of events are presented in the following 277 
sections.  278 
3.1. Residue treater 279 
Methomyl is a white, crystalline solid insecticide with a slight sulfurous odor. Methomyl dust is 280 
combustible and can form an explosive mixture when dispersed in air, and can also disrupt the functions 281 
of the central and peripheral nervous system. Methyl isocyanate, or MIC, is one of the key chemicals used 282 
to make methomyl. It is highly reactive with water and must be stored in stainless steel or glass containers 283 
Figure 3: Membership functions of probability, severity, and risk. 
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at temperatures below 40°C to prevent a highly exothermic reaction. The methomyl production process 284 
begins by reacting aldoxime with chlorine to make chloroacetaldoxime, which reacts with sodium methyl 285 
mercaptide to produce methylthioacetaldoxime (MSAO). MSAO reacts with methyl isocyanate to 286 
produce methomyl (Figure 4). Excess MIC is removed from the methomyl-solvent solution and the 287 
solution is then pumped to the crystallizers where an anti-solvent is added to cause the methomyl to 288 
crystallize. Finally, the crystallized methomyl is separated from the solvents in the centrifuges and the 289 
methomyl cake is removed, dried, cooled, packaged in drums, and moved to the warehouse. The residual 290 
liquid from the centrifuges contains very small quantities of methomyl and other impurities (CSB 2011). 291 
 Figure 4: Methomyl synthesis process flow (CSB 2011). 292 
 293 
Distillation separates the solvents in solvent recovery flashers and recycles the solvents to the start of 294 
the process (Figure 5). The unvaporized solvents and impurities, including up to 22 percent methomyl, 295 
accumulate in the bottom of the flasher. The flammable liquids can be used as fuel in the facility steam 296 
boilers, but before this flammable waste liquid (called “flasher bottoms”) can be pumped to an auxiliary 297 
fuel tank, the methomyl concentration has to be reduced to not more than 0.5 percent by weight for 298 
environmental and processing considerations (CSB 2011).  299 
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Figure 5: Methomyl centrifuge and solvent recovery process flow (CSB 2011). 300 
 301 
The residue treater, which is a 4500-gallon pressure vessel with a maximum allowable operating 302 
pressure of 50 psig, is used to dilute the incoming flasher bottoms, and is designed to operate at a high 303 
sufficiently high temperature, and with sufficient residence time, to decompose the methomyl in the 304 
flasher bottoms stream to below 0.5 percent by weight (Figure 6). The solvent and residual waste material 305 
is transferred to the auxiliary fuel tank for use as a fuel in the facility steam boiler. Vapor generated in the 306 
methomyl decomposition reaction exits through the vent condenser to the process vent system where 307 
toxic and flammable vapor is removed (CSB 2011).  308 
Figure 6: Residue treater piping system layout (CSB 2011). 309 
3.2. Events timeline 310 
At approximately 23:33 on 28 August 2008, a runaway chemical reaction caused a violent explosion 311 
at a manufacturing facility located in Institute, West Virginia. The accident occurred during the first 312 
methomyl restart after an extended outage to install a new process control system and a stainless steel 313 
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pressure vessel. During normal operations, dissolved methomyl and other waste chemicals are fed into the 314 
preheated residue treater, which is partially filled with solvent. The methomyl safely decomposes inside 315 
the residue treater to a concentration of less than 0.5 percent by weight. On the night of the incident, 316 
methomyl-containing solvent was pumped into the residue treater before the vessel was pre-filled with 317 
clean solvent and heated to the required minimum operating temperature specified in the operating 318 
procedure. The emergency vent system was overwhelmed by the evolving gas from the runaway 319 
decomposition reaction of the methomyl, and the residue treater exploded violently (CSB 2011). 320 
On the day of the accident at approximately 4:00, the outside operator manually opened the residue 321 
treater feed control valve and began feeding flasher bottoms into the almost empty vessel. With a low 322 
flow rate of about 1.5 gallons per minute, more than 24 hours would be required to fill the residue treater 323 
to 50 percent, the normal operating level. The outside operator started the recirculation pump at 18:15, as 324 
directed by the board operator. The residue treater liquid level was approximately 30 percent (1,300 325 
gallons), the temperature ranged between 60°C and 65°C, still significantly below the critical 326 
decomposition temperature of 135°C, and the pressure remained constant at 22 psig. At 18:38, the 327 
temperature began to steadily rise at a rate of about 0.6 degrees per minute (Figure 7). At 22:21, the level 328 
was 51 percent when the recirculation flow suddenly dropped to zero. In less than three minutes, the 329 
temperature reached 141°C, rapidly approaching the safe operating limit of 155°C, and was climbing at 330 
the rate of more than two degrees per minute. At approximately 22:25, the residue treater high pressure 331 
alarm sounded at the work station. The board operator immediately observed that the residue treater 332 
pressure was above the maximum operating pressure and climbing rapidly but did not understand what 333 
was wrong. He therefore asked two outside operators to investigate why the pressure in the residue treater 334 
was unexpectedly increasing. About 10 minutes later, as the two operators approached the newly installed 335 
residue treater, it suddenly and violently ruptured (CSB 2011). 336 
Approximately 2,200 gallons of flammable solvents and toxic insecticide residues sprayed onto the 337 
road and into the unit and immediately erupted in flames as severed electrical cables, or sparks from steel 338 
debris striking the concrete, ignited the solvent vapor. Debris was thrown in all directions, to a distance of 339 
some hundreds of feet. The blast over-pressure moderately damaged the unit control building and other 340 
nearby structures. Fortunately, a steel blanket protected a 6,700-gallon methyl isocyanate storage tank 341 
from flying debris and from the radiant heat generated by the nearby fires that burned for more than four 342 
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hours. One employee died at the scene from blunt force trauma and thermal burn injuries, and the second 343 
employee died 41 days later. Residences, businesses, and vehicles as far as seven miles from the 344 
explosion epicenter sustained over-pressure damage that included minor structural and exterior damage, 345 
and broken windows. Acrid, dense smoke billowed from the fire into the calm night air for many hours. 346 
Smoke drifted over nearby roads, forcing many road closures and disrupting highway traffic. Methomyl 347 
and solvents were released from the residue treater, and solvents and other toxic chemicals, including 348 
flammable and toxic MIC, were released from ruptured unit piping. The released chemicals rapidly 349 
ignited, producing undetermined combustion products (CSB 2011).  350 
 351 
Figure 7: Residue treater process variables before the explosion (CSB 2011). 352 
4. Application 353 
The explosion happened during startup; therefore the startup operation is considered for modeling. 354 
4.1. Situational network development 355 
By consulting a chemical expert who has eight years‟ experience in the oil industry and analyzing the 356 
accident investigation report, several possible abnormal situations in the residue treater environment are 357 
determined, as follows: 358 
 Situation of vent condenser failure (SVC) 359 
 Situation of abnormal liquid level (SAL) 360 
 Situation of abnormal recirculation (SAR) 361 
Explosion 
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 Situation of high pressure (SHP) 362 
 Situation of abnormal temperature (SAT) 363 
 Situation of high concentration of methomyl (SHC) 364 
 Situation of runaway reaction (SRR) 365 
In the following sections, the situations are modeled based on the proposed methodology. The CPTs 366 
of focal objects, which delegate the situations are presented, and the CPTs of other objects are omitted. 367 
The majority of failure probabilities are determined based on data recorded by OREDA (2002), and the 368 
use of expert judgment in a limited number of places. The focal objects are colored blue, other objects are 369 
shown in yellow and observable variables are colored green. It is worth noting that the states of 370 
observable variables are determined by using a fuzzy portioning method to improve traditional 371 
discretization methods (Naderpour et al. 2013).  372 
4.1.1. Situation of vent condenser failure (SVC) 373 
A vent condenser is a plume abatement device which cools and condenses the vented steam by cold 374 
plant water. At the residue treater, vapor generated in the methomyl decomposition reaction exits through 375 
the vent condenser to the process vent system where toxic and flammable vapor are removed. Any 376 
problem at the vent condenser will lead to an imbalance in the crystallizer solvent ratios and excess 377 
MSAO in the flasher bottoms. The objects, model, and CPT of SVC are presented in Table 2, Figure 8, 378 
and Table 3, respectively.  379 
Table 2: SVC objects and symbols. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Loss of chilled cooling water supply LCW 3.66E-05 
Cooling water isolation valve is inadvertently closed CWC 2.00E-02 
Cooling water isolation valve is plugged CWP 6.91E-03 
 380 
Table 3: CPT of P(SVC| LCW, CWC, CWP). 
Variables States and probabilities 
LCW Failure Success 
CWC Failure Success Failure Success 
CWP Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure Success 
Hazardous 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Safe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SVC 
CWC LCW CWP 
Figure 8: SVC model. 
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4.1.2. Situation of abnormal liquid level (SAL) 381 
The startup sequence requires the board operator, with the assistance of an outside operator, to 382 
manually pre-fill the residue treater with solvent to the minimum level of about 30 percent and to start the 383 
pump and achieve steady state recirculation. This is essential for safe, controlled methomyl 384 
decomposition, and starting routine operation, i.e. incoming flasher bottoms in the solvent at a lower level 385 
will increase the methomyl concentrate. The objects, model, and CPT of SAL are presented in Table 4, 386 
Figure 9, and Table 5, respectively. A level transmitter provides the residue treater liquid level (L), so 387 
SAL can be inferred by this variable. The value range of the liquid level variable is divided into three 388 
fuzzy states: Low, Normal and High. The membership function of L is determined and illustrated as 389 
follows: 390 
  ( )( )  {
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 394 
Table 4: SAL objects and symbols. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Level transmitter LT 1.40E-04 
Manual level control MLC OR gate 
Manual feed valve MFV 1.40E-01 
Manual discharge valve MDV 1.40E-01 
Failure of outside operator in operating manual valves FOL 2.70E-01 
 395 
 396 
Table 5: CPT of P(SAL| MLC, LT). 
Variables States and probabilities 
MLC Failure Success 
LT Failure Success Failure Success 
Hazardous 1 1 1 0 
Safe 0 0 0 1 
4.1.3. Situation of abnormal recirculation (SAR) 397 





FOL MFV MDV 
L 
  ( ) 
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The residue treater recirculation system is used to heat the solvent at the beginning of a new 398 
production run, mix the incoming flasher bottoms in the partially filled vessel, and remove excess heat 399 
generated by the exothermic decomposition of the methomyl inside the vessel. During startup, the control 400 
system modulates the recirculation and steam flows through the heater. When the liquid temperature 401 
increases to the set-point limit, the control system closes the steam flow valve, and changes the position 402 
of the circulation valves to redirect the recirculation flow from the heater to the cooler. The objects, 403 
model, and CPT of SHL are presented in Table 6, Figure 10, and Table 7, respectively. A pump provides 404 
a steady state recirculation, and a flow transmitter measures the flow of liquid through the recirculation 405 
pipeline. The measurement is converted from electrical signals and sent to the DCS by the flow 406 
transmitter. This allows operators to visualize the amount of liquid being transferred through the heating 407 
cycle during startup. The value range of the recirculation flow (F) is divided into three fuzzy states, Very 408 
Low, Low, and Normal, as shown in Figure 10, and the membership function of F is determined as 409 
follows: 410 
  (  )( )  {
                                                         
(    )   ⁄                            
                                           (12) 411 
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                                         (14) 413 
Table 6: SAR objects and symbols. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Flow transmitter FT 7.13E-06 
Recirculation pump RP 4.00E-02 
Temperature sensor in recirculation TS 4.00E-02 
Automatic steam valve ASV 8.68E-06 








Figure 10: SAR model and membership function of recirculation flow. 
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Table 7: CPT of P(SAR| FT, AHS). 
Variables States and probabilities 
FT Failure Success 
AHS Failure Success Failure Success 
Hazardous 1 1 1 0 
Safe 0 0 0 1 
4.1.4. Situation of high pressure (SHP)  416 
The residue treater includes a pressure vessel with a maximum allowable operating pressure of 50 psig 417 
and an automatic pressure control. The vent condenser at the top of the residue treater, which is prone to 418 
blockages during unit operation, passes the gases produced by the methomyl decomposition reaction to 419 
the flare system. The gas flow carries trace amounts of solid material into the vent system, which are 420 
deposited on the surface of the pipe, and over time, accumulated deposits can choke the flow and cause 421 
the residue treater pressure to climb. The objects, model, and CPT of SHP are presented in Table 8, 422 
Figure 11, and Table 9 respectively. The situation is connected to node P because it can be inferred from 423 
the pressure variable (P). The residue treater is normally operated at 20 psig. The pressure value range is 424 
divided into three fuzzy states, Normal, High, and Very High, and the membership function of P is 425 
determined as follows, and as shown in Figure 11: 426 
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Table 8: SHP objects and symbols. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Pressure transmitter PT 1.64E-01 
Automatic relief valve (mechanical failure) ARV 3.40E-01 
Automatic pressure control APC OR gate 
Failure of outside operator in operating manual valve FOP 2.70E-01 
Manual relief valve MRV 1.39E-01 
Manual pressure control MPC OR gate 
High pressure protection system HPP AND gate 
Accumulating deposits at vent condenser piping AD 4.95E-06 
Situation of vent condenser failure SVC NA 
Inadequate ventilation IV OR gate 
 430 
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 431 
Table 9: CPT of P(SHP| HPP, IV). 
Variables States and probabilities 
HPP Failure Success 
IV Failure Success Failure Success 
Hazardous 1 0 0 0 
Safe 0 1 1 1 
4.1.5. Situation of abnormal temperature (SAT) 432 
A minimum temperature interlock prevents the feed control valve from opening until the minimum 433 
temperature of the residue treater contents are at, or above, the set-point. During startup, an automatic 434 
temperature control system monitors the bulk liquid temperature inside the vessel. Steam flows are used 435 
to heat the solvent. At normal operating conditions, the temperature of the flasher bottoms liquid is kept at 436 
about 80°C to prevent uncontrolled auto-decomposition of the more highly concentrated methomyl. The 437 
contents of the residue treater are maintained at approximately 135°C, a temperature that ensures that the 438 
incoming methomyl will quickly decompose to avoid accumulation to an unsafe concentration inside the 439 
residue treater. The objects, model, and CPT of SAT are presented in Table 10, Figure 12, and Table 11, 440 
respectively. A temperature transmitter provides the residue treater temperature (T) that is used for 441 
inferring SAT. The temperature value range is divided into three fuzzy states, Low, Normal, and High, as 442 
shown in Figure 12, and the membership function of T is determined as follows: 443 
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Figure 11: SHP model and membership function of pressure. 
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Table 10: SAT objects and symbols. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Temperature transmitter TT 6.84E-06 
Situation of abnormal recirculation SAR NA 
Automatic temperature control ATC OR gate 
Failure of outside operator to operate steam valve FOT 1.00E-01 
Manual steam valve MSV 1.39E-06 
Manual temperature control MTC OR gate 
 450 
 451 
Table 11: CPT of P(SAT| ATC, MTC). 
Variables States and probabilities 
ATC Failure Success 
MTC Failure Success Failure Success 
Hazardous 1 0 0 0 
Safe 0 1 1 1 
4.1.6. Situation of high concentration of methomyl (SHC) 452 
The methomyl safely decomposes inside the residue treater to a concentration of less than 0.5 percent 453 
by weight. If the tank is allowed to cool below 130°C for any reason, it must be sampled before being 454 
heated up again. In addition, if the tank has a liquid level lower than 30 percent, the concentration of 455 
methomyl will increase when the flasher bottoms are introduced into residue treater. The objects, model, 456 
and CPT of SHC are presented in Table 12, Figure 13, and Table 13, respectively. 457 
Table 12: SHC objects and symbols. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Situation of abnormal liquid level SAL NA 
Failure of outside operator to understand liquid level FON 1.00E-02 
High concentration of methomyl because of low liquid level HCL AND gate 
Situation of abnormal temperature SAT NA 
Manual concentration control MCC OR gate 
Failure of outside operator in sampling FOS 2.00E-01 
Failure of laboratory in testing the concentration of methomyl FLN 1.00E-02 






Figure 12: SAT model and membership function of temperature. 
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 458 
Table 13: CPT of P(SHC| HCT, HCL). 
Variables States and probabilities 
HCT Failure Success 
HCL Failure Success Failure Success 
Hazardous 1 1 1 0 
Safe 0 0 0 1 
4.1.7. Situation of runaway reaction (SRR) 459 
A runaway reaction is a chemical reaction over which control has been lost. The reaction speed 460 
continues to accelerate until the reaction either runs out of reactants or the vessel containing it over-461 
pressurizes and containment is lost. The temporal arcs point to the SRR situation because it is assumed 462 
that the situation is formed after a time interval. The interpretation is that the runaway reaction occurs 463 
when a high concentration of methomyl exists for a few minutes inside the vessel and a high pressure 464 
situation exists in the environment. The objects, model, and CPT of SRR are presented in Table 14, 465 
Figure 14, and Table 15, respectively. 466 
Table 14: SRR objects and symbols. 
Objects Symbol  
Situation of high pressure SHP  
Situation of high concentration of methomyl   SHC  
 467 
 468 
Table 15: CPT of P(SRR| SHC, SHP, SRR). 
Variables States and probabilities 
SHC Hazardous Safe 
SHP Hazardous Safe Hazardous Safe 
SRR Hazardous Safe Hazardous Safe Hazardous Safe Hazardous Safe 
Hazardous 1 0.99 0.05 0.05 0.4 0.05 0.05 0 
Safe 0 0.01 0.95 0.95 0.6 0.95 0.95 1 
SRR 
SHC SHP 
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4.1.8. Situational network 469 
The environment has a continuous air monitor system, which is located in and around the production 470 
unit, with 16 stationary sample points to detect fugitive leaks from process equipment. It detects 471 
concentrations of airborne chemical contaminants and alerts facility occupants if air concentration 472 
exceeds safe levels (1.0 ppm). In addition, a fire alarm and several fire cannons are located in the 473 
environment to reduce damage if a fire occurs. The air monitor system, alarm, and fire cannons are 474 
considered to be safety barriers, as shown in Table 16. The probability of the existence of spark is also 475 
estimated in this table.  476 
Table 16: Safety barriers and chance of spark. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Air monitor system AM 0.18E-06 
Fire alarm FA 1.30E-03 
Fire cannon FC 4.00E-01 
Spark SP 1.00E-01 
The SRR can have results that range from the boiling over of the reaction mass to large increases in 477 
temperature and pressure that lead to an explosion. Such violent reactions can cause blast and missile 478 
damage. If flammable materials are released, fire or secondary explosion may result. Hot liquids and toxic 479 
materials may contaminate the workplace or generate a toxic cloud that may spread off-site. There can be 480 
serious risk of injury, even death, to plant operators, as well as the general public, and the local 481 
environment may be harmed. Therefore, SRR has a consequence node whose states are determined using 482 
consequence analysis, as described in the modeling process and presented in Table 17. The table contains 483 
the degree of loss corresponding to every state, which is evaluated by the expert.  484 
Table 17: The states of SRR consequences node. 
Consequence Symbol Loss ($) 
Explosion with high death and high property damage C1 1E+07 
Fire with high death and moderate property damage C2 7E+06 
Fire with low death and high property damage C3 5E+06 
Fire with low death and moderate property damage C4 4E+06 
Ruptured vessel with vapor cloud with possibility of ignition C5 3E+06 
Safe evacuation C6 1E+06 
Safe state C7 0E+00 
Note: the safe state indicates the safe state of SRR. 
For other situations, the resultant situation is considered to be a consequence of the occurrence. The 485 
degree of loss in these situations is also calculated and summarized in Table 18. A situational network for 486 
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Table 18: Loss of situations. 
Situation Consequence of occurrence Loss ($) 
SAR SLT 1E+03 
SLT SHC 1E+04 
SLL SHC 1E+04 
SHC SRR 3E+06 
SVC SHP 1E+03 

















Figure 15: The situational network. 507 
4.1.9. Situational network evaluation 508 
Application of the sensitivity to findings shows that the query variable, SRR, in the absence of other 509 
evidence, is most sensitive to SHP, followed by observable variable P. This is what the experts expected 510 
because SRR results if methomyl is allowed to accumulate in the residue treater and the pressure relief 511 
system is not working properly. When findings for observable variable P (i.e. P=High) are entered into 512 
the network, the sensitivity measures and the ranking of variables are changed. With this evidence, SRR 513 
is most sensitive to SHC and SAL, followed by observable variable L. Alternatively, when P=High and 514 
L=High are entered into the network, some of the remaining variables become more influential. These 515 
observations agreed with the experts understanding of the situational network. 516 
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Sensitivity to parameters was analyzed in the CTPs of observable variables which were determined by 517 
the experts. For instance, scenario S=(SRR, Hazardous, E={SHP=Hazardous, T=High}) was investigated 518 
in which the hypothesis under consideration is SRR=Hazardous, while the parameter in focus is 519 
P(T=High| SAT=Hazardous). Therefore, the sensitivity function  ( ) was defined as follows: 520 
 ( )   (                                    )  
    
    
                   (21) 521 
The coefficients of denominator and numerator functions were determined separately. Both functions 522 
are linear in the parameter t. Thus, the coefficients of each function were determined by propagating 523 
evidence for two different parameter values. The sensitivity function resulted as follows when t0=0.1 and 524 
t1=0.2 were used to propagate evidence: 525 
 ( )  
            
       
                                                            (22) 526 
The graph of the sensitivity function f (t) for all possible values of t, i.e. values between zero and one, 527 
is plotted in Figure 16. As can be seen, the minimum value of the probability of the hypothesis is 0.0001 528 
for t=0, while the maximum value of the probability of the hypothesis is 0.887 for t=1. Clearly, the 529 
posterior probability of the hypothesis is more sensitive to variations in the parameter value when the 530 
initial parameter value is in the range from 0 to, say, 0.5 than when the initial parameter is in the range 531 
from 0.5 to 1. 532 
Figure 16: The graph of the sensitivity function f(t)= P(SRR= Hazardous| E). 533 
4.2. The Human-System Interface 534 
A graphical user interface for the proposed situational network is developed that does not control the 535 
manner of actions and maintains the operator‟s involvement in the decision-making process. The 536 
development of human-computer interactions indicates that, with insufficient automation, operators will 537 
have an excessive workload, whereas too much automation may disconnect operators from the system 538 
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and alienate them from the production process (Brannon et al. 2009). Therefore, keeping operators in the 539 
loop of decision-making, taking action, and updating the related information are critical issues in 540 
designing support systems. This level corresponds to level 5 of automation, called decision support, 541 
proposed by Kaber and Endsley (2004). The human-system interface is shown in Figure 17. Because 542 
modeling of the situational network for the residue treater led to a complex model, object oriented BNs 543 
(OOBNs) were used in the development process. The system is set to trigger an alarm for every situation 544 
that has a risk level in excess of 2.5, i.e. tolerable not acceptable. In addition, mouse-clicking any 545 
situation in the interface opens a pop-up window that contains the related sub-network, including 546 
contributing objects, their failure probabilities, and the most probable explanation.  547 
Figure 17: The human-system interface based on OOBNs. 548 
 549 
4.3. Situational network analysis 550 
The performance of the proposed methodology is investigated through the accident timeline events in 551 
the residue treater environment explained in Section 3.2, and by using the developed system.  552 
 553 
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4.3.1. Scenario 554 
On the night of the accident, the critical startup safety prerequisites, pre-startup solvent fill and heat-555 
up were omitted from the restart activities. Furthermore, the board operators bypassed the minimum 556 
operating temperature interlock that prevented adding methomyl into the residue treater, as some 557 
operators were accustomed to doing. At about 23:45 the board operator started to pre-fill the vessel with 558 
solvent and heat the content to achieve the required minimum operating temperature. At 04:00 on 28 559 
August, the residue treater liquid level was approximately 15 percent, significantly below the critical 560 
required solvent level (30 percent), and the temperature was around 65°C, still significantly below 135°C, 561 
the critical decomposition temperature. The outside operator prematurely opened the residue treater feed 562 
control valve and began to feed flasher bottoms into the vessel to start a routine operation. To simplify the 563 
presentation of situational network performance, the last hour before the explosion is chosen, i.e. from 564 
21:30 to 22:30 on 28 August. The trend of observable variables for the period of study is illustrated in 565 
Figure 18. At 21:30, the residue treater liquid level was approximately 50 percent, the temperature was 566 
130°C raising steadily about 0.5 degree per minute, and the pressure was 22 psig. At 22:21, the level was 567 
51 percent when the recirculation flow suddenly dropped to zero. In less than three minutes, the 568 
temperature reached 141°C, rapidly approaching 155°C, the safe operating limit, and climbed at the rate 569 
of more than two degrees per minute. 570 
Figure 18: The trend of observable variables. 571 
4.3.2. Results 572 
The fuzzy partitioning values of observable variables based on the proposed membership functions are 573 
calculated and assigned to the situational network. The posterior probabilities of the situations are updated 574 
and the risk level of each situation is projected, as shown in Figure 19. As can be seen, the estimated risk 575 
level of SAT is 2.95 (tolerable not acceptable) at the beginning of the period because the temperature was 576 
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below the safety set-point. It then becomes tolerable not acceptable from 22:15 as the temperature 577 
deviates from the safety set-point. The risk level of SHP is acceptable, i.e. 1.65, during the period of study 578 
until 22:25 as the pressure increases and deviates the safety set-point. The risk level of SHC is 579 
unacceptable for the whole period under study because the liquid level of the solvent was below the safety 580 
set-point (30 percent), i.e. the risk level of SAL is unacceptable, and the operator opened the feed valve 581 
without considering this fact.  582 
As can be seen, the risk level of SRR is acceptable, i.e. 1.35, until 22:24, when it increases to 3.03, 583 
which is unacceptable, immediately after appearing to be an SHP.  584 
Figure 19: Projection of situation risk levels. 585 
At 22:21 when the risk level of SAR rises, the situational network shows that the most probable 586 
explanation is the failure of the recirculation pump (RP) with a probability of 0.5. At 22:25 when the risk 587 
level of SAR increases, the situational network shows that the most probable explanation is the failure of 588 
the high pressure protection system (HPP) and the failure of the automatic relief valve. The system helps 589 
the operator to prevent accidents in abnormal situations, but it can also present the factors that contribute 590 
to the creation of an accident or a specific consequence. For instance, if at 22:33 a fire with low death and 591 
high property damage (C3) is reported, the posterior probability updating from this evidence shows that 592 
the closed cooling water isolation valve (CWC) causes inadequate ventilation, and consequently SHP in 593 
the residue treater which, with SHC, creates SRR. 594 
5. Conclusion and future work 595 
Situation awareness is likely to be at the root of many accidents in safety-critical systems where 596 
multiple goals must be pursued simultaneously, multiple tasks require the operator‟s attention, operator 597 
performance is under high stress, and negative consequences associated with poor performance are 598 
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anticipated. This paper has shown a methodology for developing and analyzing a situational network to 599 
support the SA for control room operators in the decision-making process when they are confronted by 600 
abnormal situations in safety-critical systems. The proposed methodology exploits the specific 601 
capabilities of Bayesian networks and fuzzy logic systems to simulate human thinking. In addition, the 602 
methodology uses risk indicators to determine when a situation is abnormal and also to show the 603 
investigation priority whenever it is necessary. As operators do not perform mathematical calculations 604 
while performing a situation assessment, the proposed methodology provides only an approximation of 605 
operator behavior in the situation assessment process. Therefore, the proposed methodology is expected 606 
to provide the most logical results and can be considered to be optimistic. In the real world, the 607 
conclusions of a human operator will tend to be more conservative than the results of mathematical 608 
calculations based on Bayesian inference. The performance of the methodology was investigated in the 609 
residue treater environment, and an HSI considering the capabilities of OOBNs was also developed for 610 
the intended plant. As has been shown, it provides a useful graphical model that meets the requirements 611 
of a practical SA system. The Bayesian inference facilitates the inclusion of prior background knowledge 612 
and the updating of this knowledge when new information is available from the SCADA monitoring 613 
system.  614 
In comparison with previous research works (Miao et al. 1997, Kim and Seong 2006), this study has 615 
some advantages. First, situations in our method might be inclusive, unlike previous studies where 616 
situations are exclusive. Second, unlike previous networks that only include indicators and sensors and 617 
are unable to determine the cause of abnormal situations, our method enables the most probable cause of 618 
abnormal situations to be obtained from the situation models, thus assisting operators to understand 619 
situations. Third, the method is able to generate risk levels for every hazardous situation to show whether 620 
a situation is abnormal (i.e. its risk level is unacceptable), and to help operators to understand the 621 
hierarchy of investigations (i.e. a situation with a higher risk has priority over other situations to be 622 
investigated). 623 
The first direction for future study is to evaluate the performance of the proposed HSI based on a SA 624 
measurement. As in many safety-critical systems, the safety of the system is supervised by control room 625 
operators and outside operators who are members of a team, so the second future direction of the 626 
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research, therefore, is to extend the proposed system to a distributed system that applies a team situation 627 
awareness concept.   628 
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